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Introduction
I am deeply honored to have been invited to address the 
com m unity of scholars a t the University of Allahabad during its 
centenary celebration Americans and Indians share an interesting 
past we were both subject to British rule This left us with many 
shared institutions — my own university celebrated its centenary several 
years ago and I am pleased tha t we have been able to establish direct 
links betw een Illinois and A llahabad (and o ther South  Asian 
universities) over the past thirty years
While we are members of different countries we have a common 
commitment to scholarship and the search for tru th  It is in the 
voice of a scholar tha t I will speak today not th a t of a government 
official One peculiar feature of the American system  is th a t it 
encourages in and outers such  as myself This arrangem ent 
sometimes leads to confusion bu t I want to make it clear th a t today I 
am speaking purely as a scholar not as a government official
Let me also emphasize th a t I believe th a t one can speak as a 
fnend of India and as a fnend of Pakistan what I will say here today 
could ju s t as easily be addressed to a Pakistani audience Not only can 
an American view both countries in a positive light b u t to do 
otherwise to choose between one or the other does a disservice to 
both and to im portant American interests There is a deep common 
interest between India and Pakistan a close U S relationship with one 
does not exclude a close relationship with the other
Today I w ant to address several issues of regional peace and 
security m the spirit of the great son of Allahabad Jawaharlal Nehru 
Nehru is today criticized in India as having been unrealistic and 
lacking tough-m indedness I th ink  th is is wrong Nehru himself 
addressed the issue in a parliamentary debate
What exactly is idealism 4’ Idealism  is the realism  of 
tomorrow It is the capacity to know what is good for the 
day after tomorrow or for the next year, and to fashion  
yourself accordingly The practical person, the realist, 
looks at the tip of h is nose and sees little  beyond, the 
result is that he is stumbling all the time
I agree with Nehru th a t the true pragm atist is also an idealist 
(This was also the position of one of my teachers at the University of 
Chicago Hans Morgenthau who is wrongly thought of as an amoral 
realist ) Nehru will be recalled as a great world figure because he 
combined both elements Nehru was an idealist and a realist and gave 
eloquent voice to this world view If he was sometimes a contradictory 
figure it was because he reflected deep divisions w ithin Indian 
society— for example the different disciplines of M ahatma Gandhi on 
the one hand and Subhas Bose on the other—divisions which have 
their counterpart m my own and other democratic societies
South Asia Regional Dynamics
All studen ts of foreign policy face two occupational hazards 
First they invariably tend to view the world through nationalist eyes 
exaggerating the importance of their own country This is true even of 
those who hate their own nation (for example those Americans who 
think th a t the U S can do nothing right) More often nationalism  
corrodes scholarship by encouraging the belief tha t one s country can 
do no wrong
The second occupational hazard is more subtle it is th a t 
scholars often come to identify with the foreign nation they come to 
know first and best American Asian specialists do tend to become 
boosters of the Asian country they encounter first They tend to view 
the world through its eyes they come to learn about its neighbors 
through its books and scholars This academic clientitis is not all bad 
Indian scholars m ust learn how Americans think how we view the 
world m order to make informed guesses as to how we will behave in 
a particular situation We m ust be able to pu t ourselves m your shoes 
as we estimate the direction of Indian foreign policy
In the case of many American scholars our contact with South 
Asia was abruptly cut when the Government of India decided (after 
1972) to restrict our entry We wound up in many other places—I 
spent a year in East Asia learning about China and Japan  Later in the
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7 0 s  I had the opportunity to conduct research in Pakistan (even 
when U S -Pakistan relations were very hostile) and have taught a 
num ber of students from Pakistan Nepal and Bangladesh as well as 
India And of course nearly two years experience in the U S 
Government has taught me something about the way m which Indian 
and Pakistani foreign policy is conducted
All this is by way of preface to my own imperfect understanding 
of South Asian regional security issues I think there are two central 
features of the region worth special emphasis the issue of national 
identity and the changing relationship of South Asia to its international 
environment
National Identity
In his book on the Kashmir problem (still the finest writing on 
the subject) the late Sisir Gupta offered the insight th a t the major 
elements in this conflict are the images tha t India and Pakistan had 
created of themselves on the eve of Partition Sisir Babu noted that 
the differences between Islamic Pakistan and secular India went 
beyond the fate of minorities m the two countries and affected the 
entire span of their relations indeed how they came to see each 
other ultimately affected how they saw themselves and their relations 
with third states
There is no escaping the fact th a t the identities of India and 
Pakistan confront each other The very existence of Pakistan an 
Islamic state seems to challenge the notion tha t Indian Muslims can 
live m peace and harmony in secular India tha t the Muslims of India 
rem ain loyal to their (secular) government seems to challenge the 
existence of Pakistan itself Thus these two states merely have to be 
themselves to cause strain and suspicion in their relationship As Sisir 
used to argue it might be best for India if Pakistan did pursue its Gulf 
and Middle Eastern ties this would lessen its obsession with India 
His advice generally went unheeded as m ost Indians ridiculed and 
feared Pakistan s efforts to build ties with its Islamic neighbors to the 
west In an attem pt to undercut these ties (but also to meet the 
concerns of its substantial Muslim population) India has of course 
pursued its own West Asian strategy
There are those in India Pakistan and elsewhere who argue 
tha t because of this fundamental clash of identities India and Pakistan 
cannot become fnends tha t they are doomed to conflict I disagree 
on both counts
First relations between great states should not be based merely 
on friendship Friendship is a  rare commodity in international 
politics Indeed as Hans M orgenthau used to say nations have 
interests not friendships Close and friendly relations evolve out of
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common interests and tru st develops when two states work to pursue 
those common interests especially when they see such  in terests 
extending mto the distant future All the rest is propaganda
Second nothing is inevitable Relations between France and 
Germany (and earlier between France and Britain) were once as 
hostile as vicious as filled with hatred as one encounters among the 
worst India-baiters m Islamabad and Pakistan-haters m Delhi The fact 
that this fear and hatred exists is an objective reality and should not be 
underestim ated  b u t its continuation at very high levels for the 
indefinite future is not inevitable Indeed in the twenty five years I 
have been visiting South Asia I notice a marked change in the kinds of 
regional passions that stir Indians and Pakistanis
Let us try to take an objective m easure of the state of Indo- 
Pakistam  relations Let us grant th a t the very identities of the two 
sta tes  clash Let us also grant th a t the two sta tes  have other 
conflicting interests such as the dispute over Kashmir suspicions 
about support of ethnic linguistic or religious minorities and so 
forth What does this add up to?
It means tha t there will for the foreseeable future be an upper 
limit to relations between India and Pakistan It means tha t we should 
not lightly use the term friendship to describe th is relationship 
There are ties between you th a t repel th a t create fear and hostility 
But we should not necessarily assume that these will inevitably lead to 
w ar or th a t they will prevent cooperation on a whole range of 
common interests between you
For ju s t as there is an upper limit to Indo-Pakistani relations a 
ceiling on cooperation there is also a lower lim it—a floor—below 
which relations are unlikely to fall You and the Pakistanis breath the 
sam e air drink the same w ater share a goodly portion of your 
cultures are highly complex multi-ethnic societies and historically 
experienced the blessings and curse of having been ruled by the 
British India and Pakistan therefore share certain values ideas and 
ideals on managing internal and external affairs You also have similar 
economies and belong to the non-aligned movement and thus have 
similar views on how the global political economy should be organized
In short while it is easy to stress the inevitability of Indo- 
Pakistan conflict a balanced view will note tha t you and the Pakistanis 
have an incentive not to let relations between you deteriorate below a 
certain point I think th a t much of th is was codified in the Simla 
sum m it relations between you and the Pakistanis have objectively 
improved since the early 1970s despite all tha t has happened within 
each country
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There is a floor and there is a ceiling Indo-Pak relations are not 
m erely b e tte r ' or worse b u t they oscillate between these 
boundaries In my view the task  of statesm anship is to raise upward 
both the floor and the ceiling Since the ceiling is composed in part 
of the images and stereotypes of the past it can be raised by expanded 
contacts between you and the Pakistanis There is much that each of 
you will dislike in the other bu t it is better to function on the basis of 
a true (even if negative) appreciation of the other side than  on the 
basis of false images
You can also raise the floor of your relationship by seeking out 
those economic and strategic interests you do have in common with 
Pakistan The m ost im portant of these in terests is th a t you can 
damage each other India of course is the region s dominant military 
power bu t in any senous armed clash with Pakistan both would be 
gnevously hurt You also share with Pakistan a vital interest in keeping 
outside powers out of the Subcontinent Ayub Khan made a strategic 
mistake in downgrading the importance of the Chinese penetration of 
NEFA in 1962 the occupation of a good portion of South Asia by a 
superpower in 1987 does not seem to be fully understood m India nor 
do you seem to be willing to acknowledge let alone sympathize with 
w hat Pakistan has done I was a supporter of India in the 1971 
conflict b u t it is now Pakistan tha t bears the b run t of nearly three 
million refugees and the m ilitary and political harassm en t of a 
superpower Where are the Indian ideas on removing th is alien 
presence from what is here at least termed the Indian Subcontment?
The Pentagon of Power
Let me tu rn  now from the realm of Indo-Pakistan relations 
(which will always remain at the core of South Asian security matters) 
to a somewhat broader context which I have termed the pentagon of 
power My allusion is to the conjunction of five major military powers 
m South Asia Four of these sire physically present a nuclear China and 
a nuclear Soviet Umon plus the near nuclears India and Pakistan My 
own country is physically distant bu t we do have im portant regional 
interests and have become a reluctant participant in this pentagonal 
system
This pentagonal system evolved over a num ber of years In the 
1950s and 1960s the Sino-Soviet split led to active Soviet-Chinese 
competition m South Asia and intermittently brought the U S to the 
region m support of first Pakistan and then India against these two 
outside powers Nehru was prophetic—and wise—in his judgem ent 
th a t China was an independent power The Sino-Indian war was a 
tragedy for him and for India bu t C hinas present moderation can be 
seen as the ultimate vindication of Nehru s vision
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Three recent developments are relevant to th is pentagon of 
power and could conceivably transform it
• The first is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan With the 
preoccupation of Iran with its own conflict in the Gulf 
Pakistan has become strategically critical for a num ber of 
countries It is supported again not only by the U S but 
also by the Chinese the Saudis the Iranians and many 
other states worried about the fate of the Afghan people 
and the extension of Soviet military power into South Asia 
and the Gulf
• Second both India and Pakistan have an advanced bu t 
uninspected  nuclear competence Both are potential 
military nuclear powers and no one knows if and when 
their nuclear potential will be realized although there is a 
general assum ption tha t if one goes nuclear the other will 
soon follow This development not only affects regional 
relations bu t has global implications for the U S and other 
powers worried about the horizontal as well as vertical 
spread of nuclear weapons
• Finally Pakistan has more th an  survived the forcible 
partition of 1971 This is partly due to the support it has 
received from outside powers bu t more fundamentally to 
the good sense and skill of Pakistani leaders civilian and 
m ilitary This development might be som ething of a 
disappointment to those Indians who expected Pakistan to 
collapse m the post-Bhutto years I know I was greeted 
with disbelief when I returned from Islamabad with rather 
optimistic views about how martial law would wind up (and 
many Pakistanis thought I was wrong also) Pakistan is 
not yet a fully democratic state and it continues its search 
for the right mix of participation and compulsion b u t it 
m ust be respected as a major regional power Its special 
security dilemma anses from the fact th a t as large and 
powerful as it is Pakistan has as neighbors the worlds 
three largest countnes a fourth which is m revolutionary 
fervor and a fifth under alien occupation I suspect tha t 
few Indian generals would trade batons w ith the ir 
Pakistani counterparts
I do not know of a period in history when such  large and 
powerful states have interacted in the way these five powers meet in 
South Asia The closest approximation is the 19th century balance of 
power system  th a t kept the peace in Europe for nearly a hundred 
years (although it did not prevent the ravishing of much of the rest of 
the world nor did it prevent the calamities of World War I and II) 
The present system is somewhat different three of its members are 
nuclear weapons states bu t have no alliance relationship with each
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other (the way France and Britain have an alliance relationship with 
the U S  in NATO) Two are potential nuclear sta tes calculating 
w hether going nuclear would enhance their security or lessen it 
Since we are still u n ce rta in  abou t the political im pact of 
nuclearization this calculation is certain to be difficult to get nght In 
the meantime both India and Pakistan play the game of nuclear 
ambiguity increasing the nsk  of miscalculation and error
The full implications of this pentagon of power have yet to 
emerge Certainly it has affected the way m which all five powers 
relate to each other Although there is much talk in India of a Srno- 
Pak-U S alliance vs a Soviet-Indian entente the fact of the m atter is 
tha t the U S has more realistically sought to improve its relations with 
India ju s t as it entered a new assistance relationship with Pakistan 
and the Soviet Union has recognized th a t Pakistan is critically 
im portant as far as its own 'Vietnam is concerned The question in 
Indian m inds m ust be whether Pakistan is more im portant to the 
Soviets vis a  vis Afghanistan than India is to the Soviets vis a vis China 
I think we can expect such calculations to dominate relations between 
these five sta tes for the indefinite future perhaps even after the 
Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan
As I noted the revival of Pakistani military power and its 
internationally recognized diplomatic importance m ust come as a 
disappointm ent to some in this audience After 1971 it appeared that 
India would be not only the dominant power in South Asia but the sole 
military power of any consequence Since none of the other South 
Asian states touch each other (but they all touch India) New Delhi 
could afford to deal with each of them on a purely bilateral basis with 
overwhelming military superiority in each case Now India faces a 
revived Pakistan (with nuclear potential) and sees other regional 
states actively pursuing outside contacts with the superpowers and 
China Even more astonishing these smaller states have managed to 
bring forth a regional organization the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) does this imply a further dimumtion of 
Indian power?
I do not think so Neither Pakistan s revival nor the evolution of 
SAARC are harm ful to vital Indian interests In some ways they 
enhance those interests
First it has been Pakistan not India tha t has had to cope with 
the burden of three million refugees and Soviet pressure A weak 
Pakistan would have long ago made its own peace with the Soviets and 
the DRA regime ratifying the presence in South Asia of a superpower 
th a t has recently dem onstrated its expansionist and interventionist 
mood Ultimately such a Pakistan would have fallen under Soviet 
influence since there would be no other way to deal with the genuine 
war of national liberation m Afghanistan
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Second SAARC may turn  out to be a tremendous asset to Indian 
diplomacy Nations are generally known by the enemies they keep 
The perception of the outside world is th a t India has ocassionally 
taken on such fierce foes as Bangladesh Sn Lanka and Nepal as well 
as the more substantial Pakistan in its search for regional dominance 
This may be a false perception b u t SAARC—by encouraging 
cooperation between India and its m uch sm aller and weaker 
neighbors— has had the consequence of enhancing India s sta tus India 
is not the kind of country that can bully its neighbors without inviting 
scorn bu t it is the kind of country tha t can gain new respect by a 
positive regional leadership role a role tha t cannot be played without 
the active participation of those smaller neighbors SAARC provides 
the mechanism by which tha t role can be played and will in the long 
run  enhance India s sta tus as a great power Of course it also serves 
several im portan t common in terests besides various economic 
ecological and cultural projects it facilitates cooperation against the 
twin scourges of terrorism  and narcotics and gives South Asia a 
regional voice in UN and NAM fora Truly SAARC is an idea whose 
time should have come many years ago bu t I believe th a t it was 
changes in South A sías strategic and geopolitical situation  after 
December 1979 th a t brought it into existence It is tragic bu t 
probably true tha t the temporary destruction of the sovengnty of one 
South Asian country has led the others to enhanced cooperation
The Practical Idealist
One of the occupational diseases of academics is telling other 
people how to run  their affairs My brief contact with government has 
taught me how difficult it is for outsiders to offer constructive ideas 
But it has also taught me how reluctant governments are to think of 
such ideas themselves Too often for too many countries diplomacy 
m eans simply doing tomorrow w hat you did today and doing today 
w hat you did yesterday The sta tus quo is often the best course to 
follow bu t not always governments are fallible and when they make 
senous mistakes the lives of millions of innocents can be pu t a t nsk
Some of you may believe tha t it is impertinent for a foreigner to 
make observations about your own and regional affairs especially when 
his own country may be vulnerable to criticism That would be a fair 
comment in most cases bu t not in this First (as I used to argue with 
Indian diplomats during your unlam ented Emergency) offering advice 
to others is a sincere compliment One does not offer advice when the 
situation is hopeless or when there is no moral reciprocity involved I 
welcome your comments and criticisms of American policy (and I have 
never known Indians or Pakistanis to be shy about offering it) in tu rn  
my comments on regional m atters are offered in a constructive spint
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There is another reason why Americans sire concerned about 
South Asia India and its neighbors constitute a quarter of mankind 
share many values with us and your decisions especially on nuclear 
m atte rs will affect our own security  in terests  W hat follows 
therefore are some ideas about regional peace and security They 
might seem to be idealistic to some bu t then I hope they will be in 
the Nehruvian tradition of idealism
i See Things for Yourself
South Asians are great travelers It is possible for almost any of 
you to go tomorrow from New Delhi to New York and back for very 
little less if you know the nght travel agent But one cannot go from 
Hyderabad India to Hyderabad Pakistan for legitimate academic 
purposes It is very difficult for you to meet other South Asian scholars 
in your own country  except under contrived or government- 
sponsored circum stances It is parenthetically increasingly difficult 
for American scholars to come to India but that is a separate issue
As a scholar I am a great believer m seeing things for myself 
Despite my formal training and access to several great libraries I was 
deeply surprised by India when I first came here in 1963 much the 
same thing ocurred when I first went to Pakistan in 1978 despite 
several years intensive study of that country I think that your scholars 
are handicapped unfairly when it comes to regional issues Few 
Indians have visited let alone studied in Pakistan Bangladesh or Sri 
Lanka you have very few opportunities for straightforward discussions 
of regional security issues Some of these have to occur in third 
countries— the U S or Great Britain— a bizarre situation
I agree with Andrei Sakharov who recently said th a t a country 
tha t allows its people to travel abroad will be a better country out of 
necessity He was referring to the Soviet Union bu t in a lesser way 
this applies to India and Pakistan In the interest of fairness I would 
also note tha t it once applied to the U S m a limited way—which once 
(but no longer) restricted citizen travel for political reasons Scholars 
should be the first to press for the nght of foreign travel and nowhere 
more than in South Asia would such travel be a useful corrective to the 
stereotypes of the past or the disinformation of today Of course it is 
not merely a question of your government allowing you to leave bu t of 
other governments allowing you to arnve Hopefully SAARC will 
facilitate the movement of journalists scholars and other private 
citizens who wish to see for themselves what their neighbors are like
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li A Balanced Imbalance0
K Subrahm anyam  is correct when he sta tes  th a t defense 
expenditures in South Asia are not out of line India claims to spend 
ju s t over 4% of its GNP on defense and Pakistan (which also has a 
two-front problem) spends about 8% By international standards 
neither is excessive India and Pakistan m ust have a t least some 
advanced equipment if they are to maintain professional armies While 
I believe th a t deliberate planned war between India and Pakistan is 
very unlikely for the foreseeable future it would be foolish for either 
governm ent to neglect its defenses In any case a  reasonably 
equipped professional milutary establishm ent is less of a th reat to 
civilian rule than  an army that feels neglected and ignored
The issue therefore is not whether India and Pakistan should 
m aintain  large m odem  military forces The issue we should be 
debating and discussing is the composition and disposition of those 
forces an issue too important to be left to either the politicians or the 
generals South Asian armies m ust not only be able to defend their 
countries against external threats they m ust not (by their make-up 
and location) actually increase such  th rea ts Thus the central 
strategic dilemma that faces all would-be peacemakers in South Asia
• By its legitimate preparation against a hypothetical two- 
front conflict with China and Pakistan India has acquired 
the capability of defeating Pakistan
• By its attem pt to deal with its own two-front th rea t 
Pakistan has greatly increased its defensive capabilities vis 
a vis India making an Indian victory more problematic or 
at least more costly
India and Pakistan therefore find themselves driven into an arms 
race with each other India s greater size wealth and superior 
logistics systems would seem to ensure its strategic advantage but it is 
not only racing against Pakistan bu t against those states who are 
legitimately concerned about Pakistans integrity Since India itself is 
one of those states (a weak Pakistan would be as dangerous to India as 
a too-powerful Pakistan) India is m a sense racing against itself ju s t 
as Pakistan faces a hopeless task in trying to keep up with India gun 
for gun plane for plane
One solution to this strategic dilemma is easy to propose but 
difficult to achieve It would involve bargaining—perhaps tacit 
bargaining—between India and Pakistan on the levels and specific 
types of weapons and on their routine disposition Some systems 
might be excluded altogether by m utual consent For example 
neither side would import or build force multipliers such as AWACS or 
airborne refueling systems and other weapons might have specific
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ceilings India and Pakistan could agree to a certain num ber of deep 
penetration aircraft or bom bers or tanks and over the years 
modernize these forces within the agreed upon ceilings
Of course the numbers involved would not be the same for India 
and Pakistan if such a bilateral arms agreement were reached India 
has always maintained substantial superiority m aircraft and armor 
over Pakistan tha t superiority could be codified Pakistanis including 
the military freely acknowledge India s military superiority already 
The result of further analysis discussion and negotiation could be a 
stable regional military situation—what I have termed a balanced- 
imbalance Pakistan s forces would be adequate to protect it against 
an  Indian attack bu t not so large or so modem th a t they threatened 
India By and large the two countries have reached such a balanced- 
imbalance it could be further codified and perhaps some agreement 
reached on lowering overall levels of specific types
I believe tha t such an agreement would lessen the threat to India 
and Pakistan from o th e r directions Concrete signs of Indo-Pak 
cooperation on such vital m atters is bound to impress other states that 
press upon South Asia It would be more difficult for such states to 
Play you and the Pakistanis off against each other and could thus 
lessen the two-front secunty problem for both of you
There are other ways of solving the regional strategic dilemma 
It might be easier in the South Asian context to reach an agreement 
on limits on defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP Another 
path would be to agree on limits to real growth m defense spending 
E ither approach would encourage each country to maximize the 
efficiency of defense expenditure and perhaps would force a real 
rethinking of defense postures One clear advantage th a t India and 
Pakistan would have if they chose the budgetary route to regional arms 
control is tha t you have plenty of world-class economists to guide you
Since O peration Brass Tacks has been in the headlines 
recently I need say very little about agreed restrictions on military 
deployment Such operations may improve the quality of the Indian 
armed forces bu t they have frightened the Pakistanis (that may have 
been one objective) actually  strengthening  P a k is tan s  case in 
W ashington In the future such exercises could force a weak or 
nervous Pakistan government to react leading to an Indian counter­
reaction triggering off a useless arm s race or confrontation th a t no 
one wanted
I would be the first to acknowledge tha t all of these proposals 
added together would not shorten the border between India and 
Pakistan by one kilometer But the real border between such distant 
neighbors as you and Pakistan is in the political realm You are 
separate and distinct nations you m ust keep some distance between
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you—b u t there are steps you can each take to ensure th a t your 
collective security is enhanced making more secure the lives of nearly 
a quarter of the hum an race
ili Tour Nuclear Dilemma—and Ours
However we might like to the U S cannot unilaterally stop the 
Pakistani nuclear program We did not force the Pakistanis to build a 
nuclear industry we did not threaten Pakistani security we have done 
our best to w arn the Pakistanis of the political and security  
consequences of a military nuclear program Indeed if the U S had 
not reestablished a security relationship with Pakistan m 1981 it is 
possible th a t the Pakistanis would have by now produced a nuclear 
device The American connection may have deferred a Pakistani 
bomb bu t in the last analysis Pakistan s nuclear decisions will be made 
in Islamabad and based upon Pakistani assessm ents of their regional 
security environment In 1978 the Pakistanis were obsessed with 
their isolated position m South Asia their military establishm ent was 
entirely made up of obsolete Chinese and French weapons and India 
showed no signs (even under Janata) of reducing the pace of its arms 
purchases It made sense for Pakistan to consider the nuclear option 
although it makes little sense for them  to exercise it Some Indian 
strategists would like to see Pakistan go nuclear (this would justify a 
m uch larger Indian nuclear program) bu t I th ink  there is a more 
favorable future in store for you and for Pakistan
While it is not widely known m India a great deal of work has 
been done to develop the methodology and technology of verifying 
nuclear agreem ents Much of this work has been done under the 
auspices of the In ternational Atomic Energy Agency which is 
responsible for verifying sta tes commitments not to divert nuclear 
m aterial from peaceful nuclear facilities for non-peaceful purposes 
More than  one hundred states belong to the IAEA, and many of them 
have nuclear facilities subject to IAEA inspection In thirty years of 
operations the IAEA has provided assurances to all member states 
th a t none of the other member states is diverting nuclear material 
from peaceful to non-peaceful uses Moreover it has done so without 
ever com promising any m em bers proprietary inform ation about 
operations of nuclear facilities
Thus while verification can never be perfect there are well- 
established m eans of verification th a t would provide both India and 
Pakistan high confidence th a t the other side is not cheating on a 
nuclear agreem ent w ithout compromising either side s industria l 
secrets The obstacles to such  an agreem ent are political not 
technical
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While it would probably enhance your security and th a t of 
Pakistan neither country appears ready to sign the NPT or agree to 
full-scope safeguards However in the short run  there are less 
dramatic steps that could be quite useful
The technical means now exist for verification of a num ber of 
possible Indo-Pakistani nuclear agreements Compliance with such 
agreements could be verified by an international agency such as the 
IAEA or you could request the good offices of a third party (the 
Swedes and the Swiss have considerable experience in this field) or 
there could be a bilateral Indo-Pak agreement involving your own 
experts There could be an agreement to freeze the production or 
stockpiling of fissile m aterial to ban the development of trigger 
technologies or to restrict the development of delivery vehicles
Such an agreement need not involve a perm anent commitment 
It could be for a limited number of years The remainder of Rajivs and 
Z ias term s of office suggests itself ju s t as Morarji pledged tha t India 
would not work on a nuclear device while he was prime m inister 
That pledge was credible because of Morarji s known aversion to 
nuclear weapons a Rajiv-Zia agreement could rest upon enough 
verification to ensure tha t neither side feared cheating by the other
A tim e-bound agreem ent now would give both sides time to 
breath and consider the future Frankly while going nuclear is very 
popular m Pakistan and reasonably so here I don t think it is m the 
long-term strategic in terest of either country to become a nuclear 
weapons power if there are other ways of ensuring national security 
and national greatness
Regional nuclearization certainly would not be in the interests of 
the sm aller s ta tes  of South A sia -N epa l B angaldesh and Sri 
Lanka—nor could the superpowers help bu t be disturbed Nuclear 
proliferation could not be contained in South Asia it would greatly 
enhance the risk of accidental nuclear war it would stim ulate the 
construction of SDI-type defensive systems (and these would undercut 
the prestige of those states th a t had acquired nuclear weapons) and 
proliferation would in teract with the superpow ers own delicate 
nuclear balance That balance was once very unstab le—when both 
sides had a few vulnerable nuclear weapons The U S and the Soviet 
Union then acquired vast numbers of very powerful weapons but have 
since at great cost begun to figure out technical and political ways of 
stabilizing and reducing their nuclear arsenals A great danger of 
regional proliferation would be th a t it would reverse th is historic 
process now underway of superpower reduction of nuclear weapons 
and total megatonnage
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Conclusion
I hope I have not offended you by my frankness I have tried to 
follow the advice of ancient Indian scripture Speak the Truth but not 
that which is unpleasant, speak the pleasant but not that which is 
untrue The search for peace stability and security m South Asia is a 
subject of global im portance in our in terdependent world The 
decisions tha t are made in Delhi and Islamabad will affect more than 
your quarter of the world They are your decisions and will be m ade 
m reference to your own interests But I believe that we have learned 
a great deal about living with hostile states in an  imperfect world We 
have made mistakes but Europe has been free of warfare for over forty 
years and no nuclear weapon has been dropped m anger since 1945 
This have involved a degree of luck bu t also a lot more hard thought 
and planning  It has also a t tim es required  a degree of 
vision—looking beyond the immediate issues th a t we confront on a 
day-to-day basis to see where we are heading Nehru had this wisdom 
and vision we need look no further for inspiration
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